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In 1970, at Queen's University Belfast, Claire Palley became the first
woman to hold a Chair in Law at a United Kingdom university.
However, little is known about the circumstances surrounding this
event, or Claire Palley herself. This article (part of an extended project
exploring her life history) seeks to address the question `Was there
something about Claire Palley herself that made it more likely she
would become the United Kingdom's first female law professor?'
Initially focusing on method, it seeks to answer that question by
utilizing, for the first time in the context of legal education, the
theoretical perspective provided by the work of the sociologist
Margaret Archer. Reflecting upon Claire Palley's subjectivity, it
focuses on those aspects of her personality which enabled her to
pursue a successful career and become a pioneer in her chosen
profession.
INTRODUCTION
Both at the time of her appointment and since, almost nothing has been said
publicly about Professor Palley's pioneering role. At the time, there was no
mention of her appointment in the Times, despite the fact that the paper took
its role as a journal of record seriously then, and included a section on
`University News'. It was not until the appointment of Gillian White at
Manchester in 1975 (the second woman to become a Law Professor in the
United Kingdom) that Claire Palley's appointment was mentioned in the
Times. Professor C.F. Parker, then President of the Society of Public
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Teachers of Law (SPTL) wrote to the paper to point out that a statement
released by Manchester University, talking about Gillian White as the first
English woman to be appointed to a Chair in Law in the United Kingdom,
was very carefully worded. He noted that Claire Palley (who had been born
in South Africa) and Frances Moran (Professor of Law at Trinity College
Dublin 1944±63) had both held chairs in Law before Gillian White.1
(Professor Parker's reference to Frances Moran, the very distinguished
holder of the Regius Chair in Law at Trinity College, is rather confusing, as
she did not hold a United Kingdom Chair). This discussion of Claire's
appointment came not only several years after the event, but was also
somewhat opaque. Similarly, when the history of Queen's University Belfast
was published in 1994 no mention was made of Claire's achievement.2 Thus
the public record of the appointment of the first woman to hold a Chair in
Law in the United Kingdom is extremely scant.
One of the most frequent questions I am asked about the appointment of
Claire Palley is `Why her?' `What was it about her that made it likely she
would be the first woman to occupy a Chair in Law in a United Kingdom
university?' These questions, of course, are mainly focused on only half the
story, what social scientists call `agency', based on the characteristics of the
individual involved. In the main, this article focuses on providing an answer
to that question by analysing Claire Palley's subjectivity. But in thinking
about an individual's subjectivity, we also have to take account of
`structure', which includes forces in society such as criteria for appointment
and promotion.3 And in thinking about structure, we also need to take
account of `culture', the attitudes, behaviours, and ways of doing things
which reflect a shared understanding of the way the world works. As this
project progresses, it is intended to take a holistic approach to Claire Palley's
life, placing it in its social, economic, and political contexts. At this initial
stage, however, the focus is firmly on Claire's subjectivity.
It is here that the theory put forward by Margaret Archer is particularly
useful. Archer is a proponent of realist social theory, which sees structure
and agency as `distinct strata of reality, as the bearers of quite different
properties and powers', and her work is often referred to as being that of a
`critical realist'.4 Technically, talking about a critical-realist approach to the
study of social life is incorrect, because critical realism is `. . . a philosophical
approach that seeks to be an ontological `` under-labourer'' for a range of
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substantive theories in the natural and social sciences.'5 `Critical realism' is
therefore used here as a convenient way of referring to theories, such as
Archer's, which share a basic commitment to critical-realist tenets.
In Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation, the most recent of a
quartet of books which Archer has written exploring aspects of this topic, she
analyses the ways in which structures influence agents, and vice versa.6 Her
basic point is that agents/actors have self-consciousness and structures do
not, and her focus is on the mediating process between the two. To deal
adequately with the interplay between structure and agency, we must specify
how structural and cultural powers impinge upon agents, and how agents use
their own personal powers to act `so rather than otherwise'.7 Structural
properties impinge upon agents so as to condition their actions; this process
involves both constraints and enablements, and they shape the situations in
which we find ourselves, such that some courses of action are impeded and
others facilitated.8 The fundamental question is `` How do agents interact
with structural constraints and enablements?'' Archer argues that they do it
through the `internal conversation', which can be broadly understood as our
innermost thoughts. In this article, I seek to show how the particular kind of
`internal conversation' in which Claire Palley engaged made her the sort of
person who might be appointed to a pioneering role in a university law
school.
LEGAL BIOGRAPHIES AND WRITING WOMEN'S HISTORY
The fact that we know so little about the appointment of Claire Palley to her
Chair in Law is unsurprising. In the legal sphere, as with other professions,
when biographies have been written, they have tended to be those of men.
This is true of the numerous biographies of judges, and in general of the
biographies of famous (and not so famous) legal practitioners. In a legal
context it is evident that even when biographies of women have been written,
they have generally concentrated on female legal practitioners or judges,
rather than academics. Recent examples include Mary Jane Mossman's
excellent comparative study of the first women to become legal practitioners
in jurisdictions ranging from India to North America, and Hilary Heilbron's
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biography of her mother, Rose Heilbron, the first female judge in England.9
Even when biographies of legal academics are written, they also tend to be
about men, such as R. Gwynedd Parry's biography of Sir David Hughes
Parry QC and Nicola Lacey's biography of Herbert Hart.10 Of course, this is
partly a reflection of the general position of women in society, and of the fact
that women were denied leading roles in these spheres. Nevertheless, the
result is that our knowledge of the (professional) lives of women legal
academics and their contribution to the development of the discipline of law
is particularly scant. Consequently, throwing light on the life of the United
Kingdom's first woman law professor enables us to reconsider what personal
qualities might assist women wishing to gain success in the (legal) academy.
As Rosemary Auchmuty said of her biographical subject, Miss Bebb (of
Bebb v. The Law Society fame), `. . . to the student of women's legal history
she is important, because she was part of a struggle for equality that is still
ongoing.'11 That is equally true of the life of Claire Palley.
BIOGRAPHICAL METHOD
In considering the use of biography as a research tool, it is useful to bear in
mind the distinction between `life story' and `life history'. As Goodson
argues, `life story' is the story we tell about our life. `Life history' is a
collaborative venture between the subject of biography and the researcher,
which draws on a wide range of evidence so as to locate the life in a broader
contextual analysis.12 The life history is the life story located within its
social, political, and historical context. In order to obtain the life story upon
which this life history is based, I interviewed Claire Palley, in her own home,
over a period of four days in November 2013. All the interviews were
recorded and transcribed, and a document produced, which tells Claire's life
story. Each interview lasted about two hours, some days for longer. In
addition, notes were taken (with Claire's permission) of informal conver-
sations during those four days, and these notes provided additional
information which was incorporated into the life-story document (which
ran to some 20,000 words). All Claire's words in this article are taken from
that source (on file with the author) unless stated otherwise. The interviews
were strongly informed by ethnographic method, viewed as `social events in
which the interviewer (and for that matter the interviewee) is a participant
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observer.'13 Claire also provided copies of various documents, including
CVs, articles, and speeches. The final life-story document was checked by
Claire for factual accuracy; she made no changes to the analysis, although
she commented upon it, and some of those comments are included in this
article.
Clearly, the production of the life story on which this life history is based
was a collaborative venture. It was also influenced by my previous experi-
ence of using an ethnographically informed approach to interviewing.14 As a
researcher, I drew up an interview schedule of topics I thought might ensure
that we explored all aspects of Claire's life, but as we talked, I also gathered
information about aspects of Claire's life which she introduced to the
conversation.15 The life story thus emerged as the consequence of a series of
what Burgess would term `conversations with a purpose'; Burgess describes
`. . . a series of friendly exchanges in order to find out about peoples' lives.'16
Discussion of obtaining data by having `conversations' inevitably leads to
a consideration of the location of the self in the research process. As Measor
and Sikes comment:
The sociologist is in the action and a part of the context. Therefore there is an
obligation on them to unpick, or at the very least document their own place in
what happened. The sociologist is not a passive transcriber, nor a dispassionate
observer.17
Feminist writing on methodology, in particular, has for some time stressed
the importance of reflexivity in research.18 In order to address these issues, I
want to draw the reader's attention to the fact that like Claire Palley, I am a
female law professor who has also undertaken substantial administrative
roles in the institutions in which I have worked. During the preparations for
this research I discovered that Claire and I shared a mutual friend (Professor
William Twining, Emeritus Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University
College London) and she told me that she had consulted him before agreeing
to participate in the research. Claire and I had never met before the
interviews took place, but we met as academic colleagues and she invited me
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to stay with her in order to carry out the interviews. Whilst I was staying with
her we discovered a mutual love of music and in between interviews listened
to concerts on the television. Following Oakley's view that `in research there
should be no intimacy without reciprocity', I also shared aspects of my life
with Claire ± we talked about husbands and families, about teaching law and
about food and music.19 As Hammersley and Atkinson comment, `The value
of pure sociability should not be underestimated as a means of building
trust.'20 The process of self-disclosure is an important aspect of life-history
research, as it reinforces the trust between researcher and researched.
Hammersley and Atkinson point out that, for the researcher, this tends to
involve presentation of those aspects of one's self and life that provide a
bridge for building relationships with participants and the suppression of
those which constitute a possible barrier.21 Claire and I both adopted this
approach, skirting round the subject of politics at first, until we had worked
out where we were both `coming from'. But, in general, Claire was very
open about all aspects of her life; on just two occasions she said, `We won't
put this down, but I'll just tell you' when she thought that to say something
publicly might hurt other people.
In drawing attention to these details of the research process, I am
acknowledging my role as researcher in the construction of the life story,
which was based around data elicited by establishing a relationship of trust
which progressed as the research progressed, to the extent that it can be
referred to as `interactive' research. Clearly, this research could also be
classed, in ethnographic terms, as `insider research'. Insider research does
not appear at all in Gold's classic categorization of field roles, and it is
frequently not discussed in textbooks on methodology.22 Some writers see
insider research as problematic: methods texts tend to stress the need to
maintain a sense of distance.23 Frequently, alienation or distance has been
seen as a positive analytical tool, and the consequent denial of self as an
epistemological necessity.24 Conventionally one is cautioned that familiarity
may be a problem; Roseneil has described the potential difficulty of being
too close `to see the sociological significance of that which appears to be
completely normal, or to form criticisms.'25 However, Coffey argues that
drawing a simple dichotomy between involvement and over-immersion is
unhelpful and crude. In her view, the self is very much part of the research
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endeavour and researchers should not seek, by implication or otherwise, to
deny that fact.26
Thus there is much debate among social scientists about the advantages
and disadvantages of `insider research'. Advantages include the researcher's
understanding of the context in which the researched subject lived, the
ability to speak a common language (including jargon and `in-jokes'), and
the likelihood of obtaining rich data from the research subject. I would
certainly argue that, for this project, my position as an academic insider
helped me to obtain some rich data. Equally, my previous experience of
carrying out insider research over extended periods has given me experience
of subjecting data gained in this way to academic critique.27 However, there
is a risk that some detachment may have been sacrificed in order to obtain
this quality of data. Nevertheless, I have striven to achieve what Bourdieu
termed `participant objectification', seeking to avoid the false choice
between the unreal intimacy of a subjectivist position and the equally
misleading superiority of objectivism.28
Oral history also plays an important part in a project such as this. As
Nelson argues:
Numerous studies have shown that there is a gap between what we can
discover when we rely on published accounts of some historical event and
what we can discover when we ask questions of the on-site participants of
those same events.29
However, oral history `can lead us astray' because as a method it is
notoriously bad for giving an overview or an accurate sequence of events.30
It is important, therefore, to understand that while at this initial stage in the
project the life history is generally presented uncritically, as the project
progresses the focus will broaden as will the critique. At present, however,
the focus is on Claire's subjectivity, and the interest lies in using the theory
of Margaret Archer to analyse the life story in an attempt to uncover what it
was about Claire Palley herself that made her a likely candidate to become
the United Kingdom's first female law professor.
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`THE INTERNAL CONVERSATION'
Margaret Archer's notion of the internal conversation involves three inter-
related arguments. First, that our subjectivity is our own internal property,
that it is real, and that it is influential. It is a personal interior property, with a
first-person subjective ontology and with powers that can be causally
efficacious in relation to ourselves and society. Secondly, we live in a social
world that has powers and properties which can constrain (and enable) our
actions. Thirdly, that we are capable of reflexively monitoring ourselves in
relation to our circumstances, whilst the structural forces are incapable of
doing the same towards us.31
Archer rejects the behaviourist argument that there is no difference in
kind between a person's knowledge about herself and her knowledge about
other people; she argues that we have inner lives, knowable only by our first-
person selves. This she conceptualizes as `the inner conversation'.32 This
private life of the mind is not simply:
. . . a passive matter of `looking inward' to see what we found there, but an
active process, in which we continuously converse with ourselves, precisely in
order to define what we do believe, do desire and do intend to do.33
Archer goes on to argue that the `internal conversation' is a process by
which:
. . . agents reflexively deliberate upon the social circumstances that they
confront . . . the ongoing `internal conversation' will mediate agents' reception
of these structural and cultural influences. In other words, our personal powers
are exercised through reflexive interior dialogue and are causally accountable
for the delineation of our concerns, the definition of our projects, the diagnosis
of our circumstances and, ultimately, the determination of our practices in
society.34
In considering the internal conversation, Archer argues that humans are
reflexive beings, who deliberate about their circumstances, and thus decide
on their personal courses of action in society. However, we do not all
exercise our reflexivity in the same way.35 Through the empirical work she
carried out in order to test her theory, she identifies humans as engaging in
three kinds of internal conversation.36 `Communicative reflexives' initiate
internal dialogues in their own minds, but seek to resolve issues by sharing
their problems, discussing their decisions with others.37 `Autonomous
reflexives' engage in an internal dialogue with themselves; they neither need
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nor wish to supplement this by external exchanges with other people.38
`Meta-reflexives' are reflexive about their own reflexivity; it is easiest to
understand this concept through an example. A person thinks:
I think X is pretty stupid; but they made a smart remark just now. Why do I
think they're stupid? Because they're obese, and I'm prejudiced about fat
people. I shouldn't be taken in by stereotypes.
This is an exercise in meta-reflexivity. Meta-reflexivity is something many
people engage in occasionally, but Archer's `meta-reflexives' engage in it
frequently.39
It is because of the ability of Archer's theory to draw out, in a particularly
clear way, the aspects of an individual's subjectivity which cause them to
take certain decisions, and make it likely that they will have certain attitudes
and hold to certain values, that it is particularly apposite as a means of
identifying what it was about Claire Palley that made it unsurprising, in
terms of her subjectivity, that she was the first female professor of law in the
United Kingdom.
Archer's theoretical work is closely argued and persuasive and is well-
regarded by her peers.40 Her ideas provide a clear framework for considering
how structural/cultural properties shape situations for agents. They constitute
constraints and enablements which are responded to by agents using their
own personal powers. This is a process of reflexive mediation, whereby
agents mediate the influence of structural factors upon the courses of action
they pursue. This reflexivity is practised through the `internal conversation'.
In the analysis which follows, I seek to demonstrate how Archer's theoretical
framework gives us insights into Claire Palley's `internal conversation', and
by so doing, provides us with some indications of the aspects of Claire
Palley's subjectivity which assisted her in becoming the United Kingdom's
first female professor of law.
CLAIRE PALLEY AND AUTONOMOUS REFLEXIVITY
In the empirical work which she published in Structure, Agency and the
Internal Conversation, Margaret Archer identified objective features in the
social background of her interviewees which were propitious for the
development of the three particular iterations of reflexivity which she
identified. For `autonomous reflexives' it was an early `contextual dis-
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continuity' which deprived them of a durable group of interlocutors and thus
threw them back upon their own internal mental resources for the purposes
of deliberation.41 As we shall see, Claire Palley generally falls into Archer's
category of `autonomous reflexive'.
Born in South Africa in 1931, her circumstances contrived to provide that
`contextual discontinuity' that Archer speaks of:
My childhood was a little bit disrupted, really, because my parents separated
(temporarily) when I was a small child, of about a year old, and I went to live
with my grandparents. I sort of regarded my grandmother as my mother really,
I suppose.
Her tendency to autonomy was developed by the fact that this was a house
full of adults, which revolved around her grandfather, who was a judge. `It
was a very, sort of, quiet house . . . [with a] huge library, I used to sit in the
library and look at the books.' Some concessions were made for the small
child, but mostly by Claire's grandmother:
I had a very close relationship with my grandmother, she was wonderful, I
used to come to her bed at about seven o'clock in the morning and then she'd
have a new fairy-tale book and she used to read to me in bed. And the tea was
brought and then we'd have tea and Marie biscuits. And then at eight o'clock
my grandfather would come from his bedroom with his newspaper and I had to
disappear.
Claire's only sibling was a younger sister, nearly eight years younger; the
age difference, especially when they were young, did not aid a close
relationship, and when they were older, the two sisters disagreed politically
for a long time, so did not grow close.42
The contextual discontinuity in Claire's life continued as she went to
boarding school, and then on to university, where she initially read micro-
biology. Her reasons for doing so are revealing:
. . . I didn't want to go back home when I left school, so I decided I would do
Microbiology; there was a book called The Microbe Hunters by a man called
Paul de Krieff and he wanted to discover microbes, but the great thing about
this was you could only do Microbiology at Capetown University, which was
why I wanted to do Microbiology.
Capetown was far away from Claire's home in Durban. So by the age of 18,
she had moved between her grandparents' home and her own, then spent
time at boarding school and finally moved away to Capetown to study.
Archer notes that it is a feature of autonomous reflexives that their social
context lacks stability, so that before a person has become familiar with it,
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they move on and are deposited in a new context.43 Thus autonomous
reflexives gather no enduring network of early friends with whom they build
a lasting relationship anchored in a common context; instead, they are
thrown back on their own resources. Claire acknowledges that this is true of
herself. Speaking of her friendship with William and Penelope Twining she
commented `But that's an exceptional friendship. I was very friendly too
with Daphne Park until she died, but I've been quite a lonely person in my
life'.
Claire's experience at university continued to reflect her tendency to
autonomous reflexivity. Archer argues that autonomous reflexives tend to
embark on projects whose realization will separate them from their initial
context and frequently represent a socio-economic break from it.44 Claire's
decision to study at Capetown was made possible financially because she
gained a scholarship, so she did not have to rely totally on her parents'
support. She gained the scholarship because she performed extremely well in
the South African Matriculation examination, which she describes as
`lucky', perhaps indicating the way she felt about its ability to facilitate her
project of studying away from home. And in moving physically so far from
home Claire's project entailed a social separation as well as an economic
one.
Another indication of Claire Palley's autonomous reflexivity appeared
when she discovered, very quickly, that microbiology was not for her:
And then I found I was behind the rest of the class, because I'd never done
advanced Mathematics at school, I'd never done Chemistry, I'd never done
Physics, Zoology was a new subject and here I was doing all these subjects and
the boys had done it all at school, and I was getting left behind; it was terrible
. . .
Claire's solution to this discovery was not to give up, or to run back home,
but to deal with the situation herself: she decided to study Law instead, and
went to see the Dean of the Law Faculty:
He was very nice; he knew my grandfather, and although it was five months
into the first year, he allowed me to change at that stage to Law and three
months later I passed the exams, which was sheer luck, because I should never
have passed, because I could pass easily things like Latin and Constitutional
Law, that was very easy, but I had to fill up with psychology and economics.
Economics was ok, but psychology . . . awful, I couldn't stand it and never
used to go, I never went to the practicals, and managed just to creep through;
one of the demonstrators used to sign me in although I wasn't there, and I just
got a Third (the only time in my life I got a Third!). And so from then I went
on with Law.
This approach to resolving a serious setback in the project upon which she
had embarked, of getting a good degree, by thinking what to do then getting
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on with it, along the lines of `I got myself into this mess, now I have to get
myself out of it' displays precisely the characteristics of Archer's
`autonomous reflexives'. These are people, Archer argues, who know what
they want in society and formulate clear projects to achieve it. If the project
is subject to `contraction' or `constraint', it is scrutinized subjectively and
lessons are learnt. Autonomous reflexives `. . . both know what they want and
also know a good deal about how to go about getting it. They do so
strategically, as agents who endorse the life-politics of the possible.'45
The second characteristic that Archer identifies in `autonomous
reflexives' is that a considerable amount of their internal conversation is
about society `. . . about the means, the `` costs'' and the `` benefits'' of seeking
to realise one's ultimate concerns within it.' Since this involves a two-way
relationship between structure and agency, which can involve both
`elastication' and `contraction' of their aspirations, autonomous reflexives
tend to change over their lifetimes. In becoming detached from their original
`social moorings', the new contexts they confront present them with a
different array of questions to answer.46 This is certainly true of Claire
Palley, who found herself moving from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia
as a direct result of marrying her husband, Ahrn Palley. She had met him at
university, when they were both studying law, although he was 17 years her
senior, and was a qualified doctor, working as a pediatrician. (He had always
wanted to be a barrister, and so studied law as a mature student.) Ahrn Palley
became an MP in Southern Rhodesia, where the Palleys moved in the late
1950s because of their opposition to apartheid.47 In fact, as they soon found
out, the political situation in Rhodesia was not much better, in terms of racial
tension, than South Africa. At that time, Rhodesia had one of the largest
white-settler populations in Africa, and a political system which was very
similar to the apartheid regime of its close neighbour, giving little voice to
the black population of more than two million people.48 Although he sat for
the Democratic Party (which Claire described as `a sort of right-wing Labour
Party') for one year, in 1958±59, Ahrn Palley, being firmly opposed the
unequal treatment of the black population, soon found it too right-wing, and
sat as an independent MP for the predominantly black constituency of
Highfield from 1962 to 1970.49 Ian Smith, later notorious as the Prime
Minister who made a unilateral declaration of independence from British
rule in 1965, described Ahrn Palley as `a one-man opposition party' and was
said, despite their political differences, to hold him `in the greatest
respect'.50 Claire too did not share the outlook of the majority of her white
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compatriots. She recalls visiting Rhodesia shortly before going to live there:
`. . . we went to see it and there were white women sitting in the hotel
drinking at ten o'clock in the morning . . . just the sort of society which I
disapproved of.'
The Palleys' radical political views meant that they were not accepted by
the ex-pat community in Rhodesia:
In fact it is one of the things that made me finally decide that the future of the
boys was in England. White society, because he was pro-African, boycotted us.
My husband wanted the children brought up as Jews, and my youngest son went
to a Jewish nursery school. When it was his fourth birthday, he invited everyone
in his class, like all the other children did, and he had his twenty three
invitations out but only two children came. I can remember him sitting waiting
at the party, waiting, waiting (and his brother, who had a birthday the same day,
but was two years older, and went to a different school, had all his classmates
there) and I can remember it to this day. Eventually my son opened his two
presents, and the ones that we had bought him. I will never forget that day.
The ostracism experienced by the Palleys while shocking in its cruelty to
their young son, was unsurprising in the context of Southern Rhodesia. As
Claire says, `People thought that there was apartheid in South Africa, but that
Southern Rhodesia was a British colony and it was fine. But it was not true in
fact. There was enormous discrimination.'51
The new situation in which she found herself provided Claire with much
to think about. She shared her husband's anti-racist views, but was not
politically active when they first arrived in Rhodesia, as she had five sons in
quick succession. However, she soon began to make her own contribution to
the struggle against apartheid:
I used to write articles in a magazine called the Central African Examiner,
which was like the Economist for Central Africa. And also in women's
magazines. So I'd write about women's rights and particularly black African
women, and their lack of rights.
Claire's decision to publish these articles, focusing on gender and social
inequality, reflects that aspect of her `internal conversation' which is about
society, and the means of realizing her concerns within it. She was bringing
up five children, but nevertheless, finding injustice around her, wanted to do
something about it, and journalism allowed her to do that.
Another feature which Archer identifies as characterizing autonomous
reflexives is an unproblematic dovetailing of their concerns; their ultimate
concern is work outside the home, and all other concerns (including inter-
personal relations) tend to be subordinated to this concern. This does not
mean such persons are inconsiderate, because they also try to elaborate what
Archer calls `an ethic of fairness', which gives other people their due, while
protecting their own ultimate concern.52 And the concern with work is not
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with ambition, but with intrinsic satisfaction ± autonomous reflexives seek
an occupational context which meets this desire, while imposing the
minimum of undesired requirements.53
The decisions that Claire Palley took about her life reflect this aspect of
Archer's theory precisely. After her move to Southern Rhodesia she was
bringing up her five sons while her husband worked as an MP, and was
managing a household of thirteen people:
I used to joke that I was running a boarding house, because I had eventually
the five children and my husband and me, which was seven and my mother-in-
law which was eight and my brother-in-law also lived with us, so that was nine
and four African servants, so that was thirteen, and you had to buy food and
shop and supervise; you'd be surprised how much organisation it took all the
time.
However, it was not long before Claire was focusing on work outside the
home as well, just as Archer would predict. She not only wrote journalism,
as we have seen, but also began to act as a research assistant for her husband,
providing him with the evidence he needed for the speeches he was making
in parliament:
I also acted as a research assistant to my husband, and did a lot of research for
him. I remember spending about three weeks on research relating to the Law
and Order Maintenance Bill, which the governing party wanted to introduce so
it could ban meetings, have a mandatory death penalty for offences like arson.
And I worked on the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act and the Offences
Against the State Act. And I researched that and he must have spent two or
three weeks on that Bill, virtually two or three weeks during all working hours
talking about Law, which was all stuff that I wrote.
In December 1959 Claire was appointed to a lectureship at the University
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. She describes it as `a branch of London
University':
The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland taught London University
degrees. And it had all sorts of benefits. All staff were required to do a London
PhD, and you were allowed to do it full-time, even though you were teaching.
You had to register for a PhD, but you were allowed to do it while you were
teaching.
Archer argues that by accentuating `work' as their prime concern,
autonomous reflexives focus upon `performative achievement' as that which
they value most highly; but because they also have to accommodate sub-
sidiary concerns, such as inter-personal relations, this involves elaborating
an `ethic of accommodation' to justify their ultimate concern with work in
relation to their treatment of others. `The ethic of accommodation offers a
definition of `` fairness'' ± a justified demarcation between the rights and
responsibilities of the subject and the rightful expectations of others.'54 This
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is not just a matter of convenience; Archer notes that autonomous reflexives
tended to be morally very sensitive, and it is important to understand that
inter-personal relations are amongst their concerns, causing them to ensure
that they dovetailed this subordinate concern with their primary one of
work.55 Claire's concern for her family, even when she was heavily involved
in her academic work, both in terms of teaching and in researching for her
PhD, can be seen in the way she structured her life (with her husband's
assistance) so as to be able to spend some `quality time' with her children:
And he was very good towards the end of my PhD, when I was trying to
complete my PhD, doing full days lecturing. And he used to come home at five
o'clock in the evening from Parliament, see that the children were bathed, see
that they had their supper, then I could come and tell them a story before they
went to bed. That way for 6 months he was absolutely wonderful when I was
finishing my doctorate.
The next defining feature of communicative reflexives is their indivi-
dualism. Archer comments: `These are independent people, whose self-
sufficiency makes them something of a `` loner''.'56 This is true regardless of
whether they are married or in a similar intimate relationship; quintessen-
tially they are not dependent upon others; they are philosophical indivi-
dualists, with a `. . . profound belief that they, and everyone else, must take
personal responsibility for themselves.'57 The autonomous, existential
quality of Claire's philosophy of life has deep roots in her upbringing:
I owe my character of being tough to my father. He said you must always stand
up for the truth, you must be brave. He told the story of George Washington
and the cherry tree. I don't know how many times I have heard that story!58
Claire's father had a strong influence on her belief in personal autonomy:
He joined up on the first day of World War 1, was decorated almost
immediately because he rescued a wounded officer, and ended up as an
officer. He was in the predecessor to the Royal Flying Corps, flying from
naval vessels, and then the RFC was formed and he trained for the first
bombing raids over Berlin . . . My father joined up again in World War 2, and
got his wings again. His attitude made me feel I must be courageous, and
although I do like to be loved, I will stand up and say things even though it's
painful.
Archer argues that every agent prioritizes their concerns, and crystallizes
them into determinate projects. They also arrive at some orientation towards
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their encounters with constraints and enablements. It is the combination of
these two deliberate outcomes which constitute their `stance' towards
society.59 The importance of `stance' is that fundamentally it represents a
subjective judgment by the agent about the importance she attaches to her
objective social context and its place in her life . . . according to their
concerns, subjects determine how much of themselves they will invest in the
social order.60 Thus `stance' means that our personal powers are crucial in
mediating the importance of society to us, and in the case of autonomous
reflexives, means that they will be `accommodative' towards the social,
seeing their context as a means towards the realisation of a concern.61
Adopting a stance:
. . . is not like holding an abstract point of view; it is rather a commitment to a
distinctive course of practical action in society. It is a commitment which
subjects make to themselves, within the internal conversation, and . . . it is an
acceptance of a particular way of being-in-the-world.62
In the case of autonomous reflexives, who invest themselves in performa-
tive concerns, this produces `. . . active agents, who are actively seeking a
context which will prove compatible with that which they care about
most.'63 We can see this reflected in Claire's life when she makes the
decision to leave Rhodesia. While her ultimate concern was to remain an
academic, Claire also wanted to fulfil her duty to her children as well as
wanting to be an activist.
Meanwhile, Ahrn and I had decided to send the children to boarding school in
England. His political views were making life increasingly difficult for them
. . . I wanted to move to the UK so that the children had somewhere to go in the
holidays, and so that I could go regularly to visit them; not only me but my
husband too. I wanted to visit them in term-time, and have them with me all
vacations. My husband used to quote Kipling to me and say how terrible it was
that children didn't see their parents for a year or couple of years, that they
needed to see their parents regularly, and it was my duty to go to the UK and
establish a home for the children . . . He brought the adverts from The Times
home, and pointed out to me the Aberystwyth appointment and eventually the
Belfast appointment . . . The whole of my life was around the children ± I
wasn't thinking of my career, the last thing I was thinking of was my career, or
that I'd get promotion when I got there. I was thinking `I've got to do things
for the children'.
Although expressed in terms of the needs of the children, it was undoubtedly
the case that when she successfully gained a lectureship at Queen's
University Belfast, it enabled Claire to pursue her own career as well as
providing her with a family home nearer to her children. By undertaking this
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move, she thus achieved the `dovetailing of concerns' which Archer
identifies as a key feature of the lives of autonomous reflexives.64
There is one final characteristic that Archer notes about autonomous
reflexives. They display a distinct preference for self-employment, or
working as lone practitioners (in academic terms, we would refer to the `lone
scholar'):
They neither need nor welcome supervision because they are their own task-
masters and shun the conviviality of group-working as a distraction . . .
However, they also contribute to the development of any institution they
belong to, because of their hard work and innovative contributions. Because
they devote themselves single-mindedly to that which they care about most,
they foster institutional growth and development . . . Hence their effects are
morphogenetic.65
The morphogenetic characteristics of Claire's character can be seen early in
her life when she was working at the University College of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, where she became Secretary of the AUT and campaigned for
equal rights for women:
. . . we got equal salary and we got equal travel rights so that when you were
terminated or whatever you had the travel rights, so that was a very great help
when I moved; my children's fares were paid for. The university fought it like
mad, but they couldn't do anything about it, there it was, it was equal, the AUT
had agreed and I had the same rights as any man who moved his family . . .
The morphogenetic character of Claire's professional life was also clear
after she had left Belfast. Claire visited the University of Kent in 1973 to act
as external assessor for a Chair appointment; while she was there she was
offered a Chair herself, which she decided to accept. As she explains:
It had become increasingly difficult for the children in Belfast, and I was under
some pressure from my husband to give up our house in Belfast (he said `It's a
waste, having a family home in Belfast when the children can't easily go
there') so I moved to Kent.
At that time, Kent was a radical Law School, with many young scholars who
were disillusioned with black-letter law and were adopting alternative socio-
legal or critical approaches instead. Claire remembers:
There was a lot of fighting about what you could teach. To give you an idea of
what it was like, the textbook for the first year English Legal System course
was Berger and Luckman's Social Construction of Reality, which is very
good, but a difficult book for first-year law students.
During the course of her first year at Kent, Claire was approached to become
Master of Darwin College, a position which involved her being only part-
time in the Law School. As Chair of the Law Board, Claire's task was to try
and mediate between a very radical Law School, which had strong views
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about the type of legal practitioners they wished to produce, and the
university's more pragmatic desire to have employable law graduates who
would go on to have conventional legal careers: `. . . my job was to get the
Law Board on board, get it on a proper footing and not throw out the baby
with the bath water':
. . . because there was very little law in the Kent degree, the result was
disproportionate numbers of Kent graduates failed the professional exams,
because they hadn't had the opportunity of doing standard Tort or Land Law
or Contract or Criminal Law which had been done in the other universities. So
other students could really sail through the exam, but these Kent people really
had a hard time, which wasn't very good for the University, as you could
imagine.
Claire was first helped and then succeeded in this morphogenetic project by
Brian Simpson, who was appointed to a Chair at Kent soon after she arrived.
One of the things Brian, as Dean of Social Sciences, had to do at Kent,
together with Claire, was to build links with the legal profession. This
brought its own challenges:
Brian and I went and cultivated the local law profession. I remember going to
one dinner and having artichokes, being taken to the local county hotel in
Canterbury and being offered dinner by the local lawyers. It was the first time
I'd had them, so it was a bit tricky! You know, you look at them on your plate
and I thought to myself `I'm not sure I know how to eat these!'
By the time she left Kent in 1984 to become Principal of St Anne's College
Oxford, Claire felt that they had implemented some changes: `Well, that was
Kent, and we managed to pull it back from the edge.' In line with Archer's
theory, Claire's tenure of administrative offices at Kent arguably reflected
her ability to contribute to the institution to which she belonged.
While most of Claire Palley's internal conversation ties in neatly with that
of an autonomous reflexive, it is important to acknowledge that her internal
conversation did not develop entirely consistently during her life. In many
ways, Claire's marriage did not contribute to her development as an
autonomous reflexive. She notes that during her marriage, she was very
much under her husband's influence (unsurprising in some ways, as he was
much older and more experienced than she was, quite apart from the
different social mores which then pertained). She commented:
During my marriage, I was very much influenced by my husband; for 13 years
I was very much under his influence. It wasn't really until I went to Belfast
and lived on my own that I had an independent life of my own. I was 35 years
old before I had a bank account ± when I went to Queen's and wanted to buy a
house, so I needed a bank account.
Thus, while during the course of her marriage Claire continued to exhibit
characteristics of an autonomous reflexive, the development of her internal
conversation should be seen in the overall context of her personal life at that
time.
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It is also the case that Claire showed some signs of meta-reflexivity as well.
Indicative of this is her comment about the way in which her attitude to race
changed around the time she went to university. She met an Indian advocate,
`. . . and I had never seen an educated dark person in my life. He was the most
charming gentleman. It made me think again . . .'. At university, studying
economics, an African student asked a question in the middle of the lecture:
And I thought to myself `Hmm what a cheek!' And then I thought to myself
`Ha! What a brilliant question!' And the professor saw that it was a brilliant
question and he stopped what he was doing and he spent the whole of the
lecture going round that question. And I remember that very well and it
changed my whole attitude towards African people.
These examples of `thinking about thinking' suggest that while Claire Palley
was generally an autonomous reflexive, she also engaged in meta-reflexivity.
Similarly, reflecting on her academic success, Claire noted the role her
husband had played in ensuring that, despite very bad morning sickness, she
still attended classes:
I did very well in my Finals, but it was because of him; he made me work. I
would never have worked, I was lazy. I had a bad phenomenon ± if you can do
things very easily you just take it for granted that you can do it, you see, `Look
how clever I am, no hands' just like riding a bicycle with no hands. Our
children do that. And I was a bit like that, until I met him.
So while autonomous reflexivity is the dominant mode of `internal conver-
sation' which Claire Palley engaged in, there is also evidence of some meta-
reflexivity. And that conclusion is borne out by the comment Claire made on
reading a first draft of this article. While regarding my interpretation of her
as an autonomous reflexive as an accurate one, she added `But I'm a meta-
reflexive as well, you know'.66 While Claire's autonomous reflexivity is
strongly reflected in her life story, there are also clear signs of meta-
reflexivity.
BECOMING THE FIRST FEMALE LAW PROFESSOR IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
When Claire moved to Belfast in 1966, she did so to take up a lectureship.
But she was rapidly promoted, first to a Readership in 1967 and then to a
Chair in Public Law in 1970. In some respects, her rapid promotion was
unsurprising; she arrived at Belfast with a PhD and having already gained
both teaching and administrative experience in Southern Rhodesia, where
she had established a law school at the University College of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. Yet, despite her previous experience, and the fact that she had
published a series of articles and a book, in other ways Claire's appointment
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was very surprising, since there were very few women legal academics at all
at that time, and very few of them held promoted positions.67
The most comprehensive sources of information on universities and their
staff at that time are the Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks. These
gathered information from all Commonwealth universities annually; each
edition is based on data gathered the previous academic year. In the 1970
edition (which contains data gathered in the 1969±70 academic year, the year
of Claire's promotion) the Yearbook records 430 men holding full-time
positions and 77 holding part-time positions in United Kingdom law schools.
Women are recorded as holding 41 full-time positions and 3 part-time
positions. Out of the 32 law schools recorded as offering `full' law degrees
(as opposed to service teaching for other disciplines) 10 had no female
academics on the staff at all.
In the 1971 edition of the Yearbook, when Claire Palley's appointment to
a Chair appears for the first time, only four other women are recorded as
holding promoted positions in the United Kingdom: Olive Stone as a Reader
at the LSE; Valentine Korah as a Reader at UCL, and Gabriele Ganz and
Evelyn Gavin as Senior Lecturers at Southampton and Strathclyde respec-
tively. This gives some indication of the historic importance of Claire's
appointment.
At the time that Claire applied for her post, it appears that Queen's was
one of the larger law schools, along with Leeds, Liverpool, and Manchester,
which all had 300±350 undergraduates.68 Only Birmingham, with 450±500
undergraduates, and Oxford and Cambridge, with over 600 each, were
larger.69 During the quinquennium 1968±73, Queen's underwent a period of
expansion, appointing thirteen new Chairs (of which Claire was one).70 It
would seem likely that a strong research profile would have been required
for a law school which was looking to make its mark and maintain its
position among its competitors.71
Claire had a PhD, awarded by London University in 1965 (it was unusual
at that time for legal academics to hold a PhD).72 She immediately published
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this with Clarendon Press (a prestigious publisher) as The Constitutional
History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888±1965. By 1967, when she was
promoted to Reader, she had also published an article in the Modern Law
Review on `The Judicial Process: UDI and the Southern Rhodesian
Judiciary'.73 In the next three years she published two articles in Zambian
publications on `rethinking the judicial role' and two in the Northern Ireland
Legal Quarterly on `Constitutional Devices in Multi-Racial and Multi-
Religious Societies' and `Wives, Creditors and the Matrimonial Home'.74
These were closely followed by another four pieces in 1970, the year she was
promoted to a Chair.75 In addition to her academic publications, she also
wrote a considerable amount of journalism. During her years in Belfast
(1966±73) she authored or co-authored around ten articles in the Times on
various aspects of human rights, both in Northern Ireland and in Rhodesia.76
Claire also told me that she regularly appeared on BBC radio programmes,
both domestically and on the World Service during these years.
Consequently, Claire was not only productive academically, she could also
contribute to raising the public profile of Queen's. In addition, her expertise
lay in Public Law and Claire told me that the law degree at Queen's at that
time included a lot of Public Law, so she could also contribute to the
teaching needs of the law school. She also taught Roman Law and Family
Law, which were other areas in which the law school had teaching needs.
Overall, Claire's agency, and her reflective autonomy, had put her into the
position where she could be promoted to a Chair.
The system of appointment at Queen's at the time involved `curators' who
sat on the appointment panel; some of these were permanent curators, drawn
from other departments and `the great and the good', while two were `special
curators' from the department or faculty in which the post was established. If
the special curators agreed on the outcome of the appointment exercise, it
was very rare for the permanent curators to intervene. In Claire's case, the
two special curators were Professor Lee Sheridan (then head of the law
school) and Professor William Twining; since they agreed on the
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appointment, the permanent curators did not question the decision.77 It
would appear that Claire Palley possessed the overall profile which it is
likely that a law school such as Queen's would have been looking for.78
When asked about making this ground-breaking appointment, Professor
Twining recalls that he did not have a sense of history at the time: `I just
thought it was the right thing to do.' The Chair for which Claire applied was
externally advertised, and there were both internal and external candidates
who were shortlisted for the post. Professor Twining recalls that at the
appointments panel, the focus, in terms of discrimination, was, in accordance
with section 3 of the Irish Universities Act 1908, on the need to avoid any
religious discrimination, rather than on the fact that a woman was being
appointed to a Chair. He also recalls that there was at the time a concern that
Queen's should not become too provincial, which to some extent favoured
ex-pats like Claire, because they had teaching experience outside Northern
Ireland.79 Yet there were, Professor Twining recalls, some people not on the
appointments committee who questioned whether a woman could hold a
Chair of Law. His recollection is that members of the committee pointed to
Frances Moran in Dublin as an example of a very successful female
Professor of Law.80
CONCLUSION
Analysing Claire Palley's life history through the theoretical lens of
Margaret Archer allows us to provide an answer to the question with which
this article began: `Was there something about Claire Palley herself that
made it likely she would become the United Kingdom's first female law
professor?' Archer's theory is very helpful in focusing attention on an
individual's subjectivity, and providing a framework with which it can be
logically analysed. Through the exploration of the `internal conversation' of
Claire Palley, it is possible to see, at various stages in her life, those aspects
of her subjectivity which contributed to her eventual appointment as a
Professor of Law in Belfast in 1970. I would suggest that Claire Palley's
clear tendency to autonomous reflexivity made her well-equipped to pursue a
successful academic career. By itself, this does not provide a complete
explanation of how it was that she became the first woman to be appointed to
a Chair in Law in the United Kingdom. But it provides strong evidence that
as a scholar and thinker who took her career, as well as her private life,
seriously, Claire Palley was certainly the type of person one might expect to
play a pioneering role in the legal academy. Her personal qualities, high-
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lighted by the Archerian analysis, included a strong streak of determination
and resilience, supported by an independence of mind which reflected an
inner strength. Thus, she was well-equipped to succeed in the male world of
legal academia in which she found herself.
In evaluating the contribution of Archer's theory to a legal biography,
while acknowledging its utility in terms of its focus on the personal qualities
of the individual, I think it is equally important to draw attention to that
which it does not do. This is not a theory (at least as it is expressed in
Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation) which encourages a
holistic analysis of the context in which the individual lived. Thus, it has
been said that Archer's theory involves `too much of an internal conver-
sation'.81 It is hard not to agree with this criticism, although it is certainly not
fatal to the insights which can usefully be drawn as a result of the application
of her theory to new data.
Application of Archer's theory has allowed us to highlight certain aspects
of Claire Palley's subjectivity, to understand how they were developed by
her circumstances and the people in her life. And, most importantly, it
encourages us to consider why certain individuals succeed and the conditions
of that possibility. Susan Bartie has argued recently that legal scholars have
much to learn from their predecessors.82 She does not limit her argument to
the simplistic one that we can learn from the past, and indeed, warns against
drawing `. . . crude connections between past lessons and future reform'.83
Bartie's more subtle argument is that studying the lives of scholarly
predecessors can be `empowering'.84 By this she means that studying the
academic careers of individual scholars can reveal how academic lawyers
have answered:
. . . the most important questions that all legal scholars must face: what and
how to write and teach. In so doing, they concentrate the reader's mind on
what makes a successful legal scholar and who legal scholars should seek to
emulate.85
This article is the beginning of an exploration of the biography of Claire
Palley which, in due course, may lead us to consider what in her scholarly
life we might wish to emulate as we contemplate the life history of the first
woman professor of law in a United Kingdom university, informed by our
knowledge of her `internal conversation' and the ways in which that
contributed to her success.
149
81 F. Vandenberghe, `Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation' in Revue du
MAUSS Permanente (19 June 2008), at <http://www.journaldumauss.net/./?structure-
agency-and-the-internal>.
82 S. Bartie, `Histories of legal scholars: the power of possibility' (2014) 34 Legal
Studies 305.
83 id.
84 id., p. 317.
85 id., p. 318.
ß 2015 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2015 Cardiff University Law School
